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The flaring up of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the early 2000s caught most 
experts by surprise. The 1990s euphoria of the Oslo ‘peace process’ suddenly 
dissipated, replaced by a second intifada; the newspeak of ‘peace dividends’ gave 
way to debates about ‘imperialism’; and instead of ‘global villageism’ there is 
now much talk about the ‘war on terrorism.’  
Interestingly, most analysts, popular as well as academic, seem to view this 
dramatic change largely as a ‘chance occurrence.’ In a world dominated by 
postmodern ‘narrative’ and ‘discourse,’ nothing is truly ‘real’ – or alternatively, 
the only ‘reality’ is what we see on television and read in the newspapers. Ac-
cording to the media, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, like all conflicts, is a mat-
ter of ethnicity, religion and culture, and these sentiments have their ups and 
downs. The prime agitators of such sentiments are ‘leaders’ of various kinds – 
state officials, army generals, spiritual figures and religious icons – whose clash-
ing urges produce different outcomes. In the present conjunction, the shift from 
peace to war was triggered by Israel’s far right, which, led by Benjamin 
Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon, decided to derail the fragile Oslo Accord in order 
to continue the settlement of Greater Israel. 
Unfortunately, so far there has been little attempt to go beyond these im-
mediate appearances. History certainly is open-ended, but it is not random. And 
while ethnicity, religion and culture are real features of our capitalist world, 
they cannot adequately explain its development. Israel is a capitalist country in 
a capitalist world, and therefore its history – including its conflict with the Pal-
estinians – needs to be situated within the broader processes of capitalist devel-
opment, local and global. Focusing on the 1990s, the purpose of this paper is to 
identify several key developments in global capitalism, examine how these 
processes altered the political economy of Israel and speculate on what they 
may mean for the future. 
 
The ‘neoliberal’ order 
During the 1990s, the global political economy of Israel was fundamentally 
transformed. The transformation had two crucial aspects. The first aspect was 
the transnationalization of ownership, a process that has had the effect of integrat-
ing the Israeli elite into the global capitalist class. The second aspect was a 
change in the nature of capital accumulation. This change involved a shift from 
‘war profits’ to ‘peace dividends’; from a regime marked by conflict and war to 
one based on high-tech and corporate amalgamation. 
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These two changes – which are crucial for understanding the domestic and 
regional politics of Israel – are global in origin. To comprehend them, we first 
need to take a step back and re-examine the so-called ‘neoliberal’ order of the 
1990s.1 The precise nature of this order remains debated, but, until recently, 
most writers seemed to agree on the following three points:  
 
1. That states were in some sense ‘declining’ relative to markets.  
2. That globalization, deregulation and technical change together contributed 
toward greater ‘competition.’ 
3. That as a consequence of declining states, globalization and intense techni-
cal change, the world was moving back toward a more ‘anarchic’ order; a 
nineteenth century-like order in the spirit of Marx, where direct power – the 
power of both state and business – was undermined by structural market 
forces.  
 
Despite their popularity, these conventions are rather questionable. Let us con-
sider each of them in turn. 
 
‘Decline’ of the state?  
During the 1990s, one popular indicator for the ‘decline’ of the state was the 
dramatic fall in budget deficits around the world. As Figure 1 demonstrates, this 
fall was real enough. The thin line in the chart shows that, globally, budget defi-
cits fell from 5.5 per cent of GDP in the mid 1980s, to 1 per cent in the late 
1990s. 
But then, the deficit is merely the difference between taxation and spending. 
And while this difference indeed fell, the overall involvement of governments – 
measured by the share of government consumption spending in GDP and indi-
cated by the thick line in the chart – has remained stable, and, recently, even 
started to rise. 
Moreover, as we all know, ‘state’ is something different from government. 
Broadly speaking, the concept of ‘state’ refers to the organization of power and 
the control of violence in society, and from this wider viewpoint it is hard to 
speak of the state as ‘declining.’  
 
Rising ‘competition’? 
The question of power relates to the second convention – namely, that the 
world has become much more ‘competitive.’  
It is of course true that the 1990s were marked by significant cultural-
ideological integration, deregulation and technical change. What is less clear is 
the impact these changes had on competition. Indeed, what exactly does it 
mean to say that the world now is ‘more’ competitive?  
                                                 
1 We emphasize the 1990s because, in our view, since the year 2000 the world may have 
begun moving away from neoliberalism. 
 2
 
 
 
 
 
BICHLER AND NITZAN: Israel’s Global Capitalism 
One straightforward yardstick for competition is the markup, normally 
measured as the per cent share of capital income in sales or value added. 
Figure 2 shows two markup series for the United States, indicating the share of 
non-labour income in value added. The thick line shows the markup for the 
U.S. manufacturing sector as a whole; the thin line shows the markup for a se-
lected subset of ten information-technology-communication industries, or ITC.  
Now, standard economic reasoning would suggest that, as competition be-
comes more intense, the markup should get squeezed – and vice versa when 
competition is lessened. Based on this logic, the data in the chart indicate that 
competition in fact has declined more or less continuously throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century. During that period, the manufacturing markup 
rose by over 1/3rd – from 45 per cent in the 1940s to 60 per cent in the late 
1990s. In the ITC sector, the markup rose from 45 per cent in the 1960s, to 60 
per cent in the early 1990s, and to nearly 80 per cent in the late 1990s.  
This last increase is especially noteworthy. The ITC sector is considered by 
many as the most ‘global’ and ‘competitive’ of all sectors, and the 1990s were 
hailed as the era of ‘competition.’ And yet, the data here seem to suggest that, 
despite globalization, deregulation and technical change, ‘competition’ in fact 
has decreased. 
One can question this conclusion by noting that manufacturing represents 
less than 20 per cent of the economy, and wonder whether the situation in other 
business sectors was perhaps radically different. The evidence in Figure 3 sug-
gests it was not. The chart shows the combined share of profit and interest in 
U.S. national income since the late 1920s. Two clear patterns are evident from 
the data. The first pattern is the systematic increase in the income share of capi-
tal. This share had risen from an average of 14 per cent in the 1930s and 1940s, 
to 18 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s. The second pattern is the continuous de-
cline in the variations of the income share of capital, as indicated by the narrow-
ing distance separating the two dotted lines in the chart. In other words, returns 
have gone up while risk has come down – the exact opposite of what one would 
expect from a process of increasing ‘competition.’ 
 
The end of ‘direct’ power? 
The contradiction between the current rhetoric of intensifying competition and 
the dynamics of increasing power is more apparent than real. The so-called 
‘high-tech revolution’ indeed gave birth to tens of thousands of software com-
panies around the world. But the simple fact remains that of these companies, 
one single corporation named Microsoft appropriates 70 per cent of all software 
profit.  
Is there a ‘paradox’ here? Not really. The so-called neoliberal era of the 
1980s and 1990s was ‘liberal’ mostly by name. In fact, the world has not gone 
back to Smith’s ‘invisible hand.’ For those who cared to look, direct power re-
mained very visible – albeit in a different form. The 1990s in particular indeed 
marked a transition, but that transition meant not the end of direct power, but 
 3
 
 
 
 
 
BICHLER AND NITZAN: Israel’s Global Capitalism 
its transformation. Specifically, there was a realignment that affected the bal-
ance of power within the world’s dominant capital groups.  
One aspect of the changing nature of power during the 1990s is illustrated 
in Figure 4. The chart contrasts the global profit share of two corporate groups. 
The first group, which we call the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition, consists of 
leading military contractors and oil companies. The second group, which we 
label the New Economy Coalition, is made of high-tech firms, both hardware and 
software. 
The changing fortunes of these two alliances are clear from the chart. Dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s, accumulation was conflict-oriented and was domi-
nated by the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition. This coalition benefited 
mainly from a global war economy and from a massive process of inflationary 
redistribution. At the height of 1980s, when military spending surpassed 5 per 
cent of world GDP and global inflation averaged 30 per cent, the firms in this 
coalition scooped over 20 per cent of all global corporate profits. 
Since the early 1990s, however, the situation changed. War profits declined 
and leading politicians and businessmen began talking about ‘peace dividends.’ 
There was a marked shift toward civilian information and telecommunication 
on the one hand, and toward capital mobility, emerging markets and mergers 
and acquisitions on the other. This shift was led by the New Economy Coali-
tion. As a result of these processes, by the end of Clinton’s presidency the New 
Economy Coalition earned nearly 15 per cent of all global profits, compared 
with a mere 3 per cent for the armament and oil firms. (Figure 4 also suggest a 
new U-turn in the making, with high-tech and corporate mergers retreating in 
favour of the reinvigoration of oil earnings and war profits. We return to this 
shift at the end of the paper.)  
These global developments serve to suggest that the evolution of Israel – 
from war profits to peace dividends, and perhaps back to war and conflict more 
recently –in fact was part of a much larger, global transformation.  
 
Domestic developments in Israel 
As noted earlier, during the 1990s, the transition toward peace dividends, high-
tech and corporate mergers was often seen as undermining the power of both 
state and business. But the reality was different, both in Israel and elsewhere. 
We begin with domestic changes, and then turn to see how Israel fits within the 
broader global picture. 
The first aspect of the new Israeli capitalism is high corporate centraliza-
tion. By the end of the 1990s, after a decade of hectic restructuring, Israeli capi-
tal had become not only more concentrated than ever before, but also deeply 
integrated with foreign investors, transnational companies and organized 
crime.2 Of the 652 companies listed on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in 1999, 82 
                                                 
2 Politicians such as Ariel Sharon, Benjamin Nethanyau, Ehud Barak and Avigdor 
Lieberman, for instance, have been linked to organized crime and Russian ‘oligarchs’ 
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were wholly or partly controlled by five dominant groups. The relative value of 
these 82 companies accounted for as much as 41 per cent of the market’s total 
capitalisation. The rest of the market was also highly concentrated. The next 
five groups, following the top five and the government, accounted for another 7 
per cent of the market.  
Following Joseph Schumpeter, many writers often hail technical change as 
the agent of ‘creative destruction,’ a force that relentlessly undermines the 
power of vested interests and entrenched power. And yet, the rapid changes in 
technology that helped transform the Israeli business landscape of the 1990s 
were hardly destructive of power. Moreover, the hand that guided these 
changes was anything but ‘invisible.’ 
In fact, the transformation of power in Israel was greatly facilitated by a 
deep symbiosis between capital and state. During the ‘ancient regime’ of the 
permanent war economy, the Israeli state was directly involved in accumula-
tion. Its engagement worked through various avenues – including military 
spending, inflationary monetary policy, transfer payments and direct owner-
ship. In the new ‘high-tech’ regime, these forms of involvement have declined 
and were replaced by the state’s indirect role of securing of ‘intellectual property 
rights.’ 
Human knowledge is always and everywhere societal, but in capitalism so-
cietal knowledge is made profitable. What makes this knowledge profitable are 
the various institutions and processes of power. Without these power institu-
tions and processes, there could be no profit in knowledge. To illustrate, knowl-
edge about the wave spectrum and how to use it for telephone and satellite is 
widely available. But this knowledge is made profitable only if most people can 
be excluded from using it – that is, unless they pay. This exclusion requires 
power, and that is where the state becomes crucial. It seems safe to argue that 
without this ‘exclusionary’ power of the state, the whole ‘ITC revolution’ would 
not have happened. In this sense, the battle for capital accumulation was and 
remains a ‘battle over the state.’ 
 
Transnationalization 
The second hallmark of the 1990s was the increasing transnationalization of 
Israeli power. In 1998, foreign ownership had risen to over 14 per cent of the 
Tel Aviv stock market, up from 3 per cent only five years earlier.  
In less than a decade, Israel was invaded by foreign investors, both private 
and institutional, conservative and adventurous, respectable and criminal, all 
lured by the prospects of peace and the smell of peace dividends. This invasion 
– which Israel’s dominant capital welcomed – has fundamentally altered the 
nature of power. 
To begin with, most of Israel’s leading domestic firms have become partly 
or wholly controlled by foreigners. The list includes companies such as Barak, 
                                                                                                                  
like Vladimir Gusinsky and Lev Leviev. The scandals surrounding their various liaisons 
probably are just the tip of the iceberg. 
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Cellcom, Class-Data, Coca-Cola-Israel, Cromatis, Elron, First-International-
Bank, Dead-Sea Corp., Gilat, Golden-Lines, Intel-Israel, Partner, Paz, Telrad 
and others. All are owned/controlled by foreign capital. In addition to these 
direct foreign holdings, global investors have also increased their indirect own-
ership through diversified portfolio acquisitions by pension, mutual and hedge 
funds. 
Simultaneously, some of the most rapidly growing Israeli firms – primarily 
in high-technology – listed their stocks abroad and quickly became foreign-
owned. Some of the better known names include Teva, Comverse, Amdocs and 
Check-Point, and there were hundreds of others who followed their footsteps. 
The most important aspect of this process, however, was the transnationali-
sation of dominant capital itself. By the late 1990s, two of the five top groups – 
Arison and Koor – were effectively in foreign hands.  
 
Israel’s global capitalism 
These developments are crucial. Behind them lies a profound change in the na-
ture of Israeli accumulation and of the Israeli ruling class.  
As foreigners bought local assets, and as Israeli capitalists acquired foreign 
ones, the combined effect was to ‘denationalize’ the Israeli capitalist class. In less 
than ten years, Israeli capitalists have become part of a ‘transnational capitalist 
class.’ Their capitalism has become ‘Globe-Israeli.’ 
This process is illustrated vividly in Figure 5. The chart shows the five-year 
moving correlation between the Tel-Aviv stock market and the Nasdaq. Every 
point on the line measures the correlation coefficient, over the previous 60 
months, between the annual rate of change of the Tel Aviv index and the an-
nual rate of change of the Nasdaq index.3 
Clearly, the long-term trend here is up. Until the mid-1980s, the correlation 
was very low and sometimes even negative. That era was characterized by a 
closed economy with militarized stagflation, restricted capital flows and regu-
lated exchange rates. But as the old order of war profits began to give way to the 
peace dividends of the ‘new economy,’ the correlation between the two markets 
rose significantly, reaching a value of 0.87 in the five years ending in March 
2004.  
This rising correlation is of critical importance, historically as well as for the 
future. Taken at face value, it suggests that, over the past five years, 87 per cent 
of the ups and downs of the Tel-Aviv stock-market were ‘determined,’ so to 
speak, not by the ups and downs of the peace process or the Intifada, but rather 
by the global ‘new economy’ and the high-tech sentiment.  
 
                                                 
3 The correlation coefficient ranges from a value of +1 indicating that both series are 
moving exactly together, to –1 meaning they move inversely, with the value 0 denoting 
that there is no systematic connection between them. 
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Capitalism and Zionism 
Until recently, Israeli capitalism and the Zionist project went hand-in-hand. 
Since its colonial inception, the Israeli ruling class had managed to interweave 
nationalist and racist ideals with capitalist praxis. During the militaristic phase, 
it harnessed the requisites of the ‘national interest’ to its own particular benefits, 
using the ‘burden of war’ as a lever of accumulation. The social cohesion 
needed to sustain the war economy was bolstered by religious and racial rheto-
ric, by welfare institutions and by cyclical armed conflicts against external ene-
mies.  
The shift toward transnationalism undermined this ‘Zionist consensus.’ In-
creasingly, dominant capital began to focus on the Nasdaq and the NYSE, on 
‘high-tech’ adventures, and on mergers and acquisitions in the rest of the world. 
And as the focus shifted, part of the country’s elite became less and less recep-
tive to the ‘garrison-state’ model, looking instead for a ‘peace process’ and a 
‘New Middle East’.  
It was at this point that the Zionist package began to unravel. The domestic 
Jewish population, no longer needed for ‘national projects,’ was left exposed to 
the harsh reality of neoliberalism. Similarly, the Palestinians, who previously 
were used for the cheapness of their labour, found themselves outbid by even 
cheaper workers imported from the global periphery.  
For the majority of the population, the new era was disastrous. In the 
1940s, Israel was one of the most egalitarian countries in the world, with the top 
20 per cent of the population earnings roughly 3 times more than the bottom 20 
per cent. At the time, the comparable ratio in the U.S. was about 10. In the 
1990s, the U.S. ratio was about 11 or 12, but the Israeli ratio soared to well over 
20 – comparable to Latin American standards. And along with inequality came 
deprivation. Unemployment is approaching record levels, and Israel is experi-
encing, for the first time ever, hunger and homelessness.  
 
The new wars 
Seen against this background, the flaring up of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 
recent years seems to signal a certain revival of Zionism. But this revival is 
highly fractured and differs significantly from the prior ‘Zionist consensus.’  
The revived Israeli-Palestinian conflict is part of a much broader shift from 
‘global villageism’ to ‘war on terrorism,’ and this shift, much like the 1990s shift 
toward ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘peace dividends,’ is intimately intertwined with a 
transformation in the nature of global accumulation. For the past few years, the 
New Economy Coalition has been in retreat, along with capital mobility, in-
vestment in emerging markets and corporate merger, while the Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition has prospered, with energy crisis and stagflation becom-
ing the main engines of accumulation. 
However, unlike during the hey days of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coa-
lition of the 1970s and 1980s, the recent renewal of conflict may not bode well 
for the now Globe-Israeli dominant capital. The increasing high-tech bent of 
many of its local investments makes it vulnerable to a global environment of 
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war and stagflation. At the same time, having diluted its domestic holdings in 
order to diversify globally, it is increasingly unable – and, indeed, has less of an 
incentive – to try to pacify the local bickering.  
The consequence of these developments is an emerging conflict within the 
Israeli ruling class. Globe-Israeli dominant capital, whose fortunes are increas-
ingly tied to the New Economy Coalition, is interested in regional peace but is 
unable and unwilling to bring it about. However, its progressive ‘withdrawal’ 
from active participation in the politics of the conflict creates a vacuum, and 
this vacuum in turn is filled by fifth-rate politicians, many with criminal connec-
tions and neo-Nazi worldviews. The bellicosity of these politicians is harmful to 
the interests of Globe-Israeli dominant capital, but it is highly serviceable to the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition and the current U.S. Administration that 
seek to keep the regional turmoil going.  
This conflict within the Israeli ruling class may create an opening, however 
tenuous, for a positive change. If Globe-Israeli accumulation no longer profits 
from the Middle East conflicts of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition, and 
if the interests of the ruling class – whether liberal or racist -- increasingly con-
flict with those of the underlying Jewish and Palestinian population, then, ob-
jectively, the condition may be ripe, perhaps more than ever, for a Palestinian-
Israeli state. Such change, however, could only come together with a radical 
political-economic transformation of Israeli society.  
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Figure 1
Public Sector Indicators (% of World GDP)
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Figure 2
The "New U.S. Economy": Greater Competition?
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Figure 3
Capital Income* as a Share of U.S. National Income
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Figure 4
Shares of Global Net Profit
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Figure 5
Converging Accumulation
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